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The clinician's decisions are subject to numerous dis-
torting influences. Computer decision aids can help avoid
these distortions 1) by placing the clinician's limited per-
sonal experience into broader perspective through com-
parison with a larger repository of clinically relevant
information; 2) by making explicit the assumptions im-
plied by his or her decisions; and 3) by alerting the
clinician whenever the decisions made do not appear
consistent with these assumptions, with the available in-
In his masterful sociologic dissection of the medical profes-
sion, Eliot Freidson (1) identifies five attributes that char-
acterize the behavior of the typical practicing clinician:
He believes in what he is doing. He believes that he is doing
good rather than harm. He has faith in the efficacy of his
treatments, and believes that what he does makes the dif-
ference between success and failure. When things go right,
he takes the credit.
He prefers action to inaction. Successful action is preferred
to unsuccessful action, but action with little chance of suc-
cess is preferred over no action at all.
He is pragmatic. He is prone to seeing apparent cause/effect
relationships (even in the absence of any theoretical foun-
dation), and is inclined to "tinker" with conventional meth-
ods-to bend the rules-if he isn't getting the results that
he expects.
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formation or with the conventional rules of logic. Prac-
tical standards of performance with respect to the de-
velopment, validation and clinical application of these
decisionaids are still in evolution, however, and a variety
of ethical and legal issues have yet to be addressed. De-
spite the promise of computer decision aids, it remains
to be seen whether their diffusion into medical practice
will improve the quality and cost of health care.
(J Am Coli CardioI1987;9:1385-96)
He is highly subjective. He depends more on his own first
hand experience and "gut feelings" than on abstract prin-
ciples or "book knowledge."
He emphasizes uncertainty in his defense. He is prone to
justify this pragmatic reliance on personal experience by
citing the Lawlessness of Chance instead of the Laws of
Science. When things go wrong, it's not his fault.
In Freidson's view, the clinician's behavior stems from
the pressures engendered by the nature of the work. The
clinician deals with individuals rather than groups, and
therefore cannot rely on epidemiologic concepts or proba-
bilities derived from population statistics. He or she is often
forced to make critical decisions in the face of overwhelming
uncertainty. In emergencies, there isn't even time to think.
In response to these pressures, the clinician has developed
a set of shortcuts-rules of thumb-and those of us who
use them well are said to possess" good clinical judgment. "
(According to S. I. Hayakawa (2), the word judgment " ... is
sense applied to the making of decisions, especially correct
decisions, and thus it depends to some degree upon the
exercise of discernment or discrimination." Decision, on
the other hand, refers to c ••• a choice among alternatives
... [and imparts] a note of acting with dispatch and, per-
haps, of using an ability to improvise as one goes along
without stopping constantly for a new search after methods
or motives." Thus, although judgment requires decision,
decision does not require judgment. Our use of the word
beliejimplies neither sense nor action.) Indeed, these short-
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cuts work very well most of the time, but for just this reason
we tend to overlook the times when they mislead us. This
is when computer decision aids may be helpful.
Why Do We Need Computer
Decision Aids?
Words distort meaning. Many medical beliefs are ex-
pressed imprecisely (3). What do physicians actually mean-
and what do they communicate-when they employ vague
words such as "often" and "sometimes" as substitutes for
precise numeric statements? When 205 individuals were
asked what numeric probability they thought was intended
by a variety of semiquantitative words, the range of esti-
mates was striking (4-7). The word "often," for example,
was thought to communicate a probability ranging from a
low of only 0.2 to a high of 0.9. Given the wide numeric
range associated with these words, we should not be sur-
prised that all meaning is sometimes totally lost. We'll never
know, for instance, what geologist David Johnston was
trying to tell us about Mount Saint Helens in early 1980
when he announced that, " ... there's probably pretty good
evidence that an eruption may be likely." He died in the
subsequent eruption (8).
Rhetoric distorts logic. According to Thomas (9), "The
great thing about human language is that it prevents us from
sticking to the matter at hand. " So powerfully can language
direct our actions, in fact, that both patients and physicians
can be led to apparently irrational decisions just by the way
we phrase a problem (10-12). Suppose you are told that
600 people are going to die this year in your coronary care
unit. There are two new treatments available (thrombolysis
and angioplasty, for those who require concrete examples).
If you give everybody treatment A only 400 people will
die. If you give everybody treatment B there is one chance
in three that nobody will die and two chances in three that
all 600 people will die. Which of these two treatments do
you prefer? Although there's really no mathematical dif-
ference between the two expected outcomes, 72% of 152
people confronted with this decision preferred the latter
treatment (12). When decision problems are framed in terms
of mortality, we tend to be willing to take risks in the hope
that fewer will die. This is called risk-seeking behavior.
Suppose instead that two other treatments are available.
If you give everybody treatment C, 200 people will be
saved. If you give everybody treatment D there is one chance
in three that all 600 people will be saved and two chances
in three that nobody will be saved. Which of these two
treatments do you prefer? Although these outcomes are iden-
tical to the preceding outcomes, 78% of 155 people now
preferred the former treatment (12). When the same decision
problem is framed in terms of survival, we tend to avoid
risks in the hope that more will be saved. Such behavior is
called risk aversion.
Words that communicate survival and mortality can be
especially compelling. For example, McNeil et al. (11) were
able to get experienced physicians, graduate students with
formal training in statistics and hospitalized patients with a
variety of unrelated diseases to prefer treatment presented
in terms of improved survival to one presented in terms of
reduced mortality, even though the data they were given
favored the latter.
Irrational perceptions of risk have been cited as another
source of biased decision making. For example, we tend to
inflate the apparent risk of situations that we perceive to be
infrequent, unfamiliar and uncontrollable (13). Thus, under
the right circumstances, physicians and patients are both
more fearful of sudden cardiac death and airplane crashes
than of automobile accidents or a fatal fall in the bath.
Actuarial statistics-and insurance company premiums-
clearly show, however, that the latter two are much more
likely.
Preconception distorts belief. Physicians tend to hold
a systematic preconception toward an assumption of ill-
ness-the patient is guilty until proved innocent, so to speak.
The classic example of this bias comes from a 1934 survey
on physician referrals for tonsillectomy by the American
Child Health Association (14). Of 1,000 children, 611 had
already had their tonsils removed. When the remaining 389
children were examined by a new group of physicians, 174
(45%) were thought to be in need of tonsillectomy. This
left 215 children with apparently normal tonsils, but when
they were again examined by a second group of physicians,
99 (46%) were thought to be in need of tonsillectomy. This
left 116 children with apparently normal tonsils, but when
they were again examined by a third group of physicians,
51 (44%) were thought to be in need of tonsillectomy. Thus,
like the teacher who "grades on a curve" and gives a certain
proportion of the class failing grades no matter what the
overall quality of the class, these physicians were inclined
to remove a certain proportion of tonsils regardless of the
signs and symptoms observed. So much for second opin-
ions.
Overconfidence distorts accuracy. Despite such cog-
nitive limitations, people tend to be overconfident about the
accuracy of their beliefs when faced with decision problems
of anything more than trivial difficulty. For example, one
group of investigators (15) gave their subjects a 20 minute
lecture explaining the concepts of odds and probability in
some detail. The subjects were then asked to state which
of two conditions (such as diabetes and suicide) they thought
occurred more often, and to express how sure they were by
stating the odds that they were correct. When the stated
odds were low «5:1) their beliefs were well calibrated,
because the actual error rate was close to that expected from
those odds (> 17%). However, when the stated odds were
high (~5: 1) their error rates were much higher than expected
from the stated odds. For example, in 157 instances in which
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the subjects thought the odds were 1,000,000:1 against being
wrong-a predicted error rate of only 0.0001%-they were
actually wrong 10% of the time!
In a study conducted at the Universite Laval in Quebec
(leClere H and Bordage G, personal communication), med-
ical students and physicians with various levels of clinical
experience were given a portion of text to read from Har-
rison's Principles of Internal Medicine. Immediately there-
after , they were asked to state a percentage that represented
their comprehension of the text and a second percentage
that represented the amount of material they thought they
would recall at a later time. They were then tested formally
for comprehension and recall. All subjects were overcon-
fident, regardless of their level of training. Measured com-
prehension averaged 33% compared with a stated value of
90%, whereas measured recall averaged 25% compared with
a stated value of 80%.
These errors are not caused solely by a lack of knowledge
(16). The same investigators (17) evaluated the origin of
diagnostic errors by presenting a series of 20 case histories
that had been previously misdiagnosed by other physicians
to a new group of 59 physicians at various levels of training.
The subjects were first asked to make a diagnosis on the
basis of the available clinical information, and were then
given a true-false test to determine if they possessed the
factual knowledge needed to correctly diagnose these cases.
Almost half of the cases (45%) were misdiagnosed, and
because most of the errors (57%) were made by individuals
who possessed adequate factual knowledge , they were at-
tributable more to faulty reasoning than to inadequate
knowledge. It is nevertheless said that everyone complains
of their memory, but no one of their judgment.
When Are Computer Decision Aids
Most Effective?
The Blois rubric. When the clinician first encounters a
patient , he must be prepared to consider any of an infinite
number of possibilities. As the problem becomes better de-
fined, however , he needs to focus his attention on only a
few alternatives. Blois (18) illustrates this process using a
diagram similar to that in Figure I. One can think of the
horizontal axis on this diagram as representing some func-
tion of clinical encounter time, and the vertical axis as the
cognitive span required to solve the problem. Thus, point
A is an early stage in the clinical encounter (for example,
just after eliciting the patient's chief complaint) when a
broad (if superficial) knowledge base is needed, and point
B is a later stage (for example, after completing the history
and physical examination) when only a small (but detailed)
knowledge base is needed. Blois contends that carbon brains
(MIT's Marvin Minsky irreverently refers to them as "meat
machines") are designed to function best at point A, whereas
c
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Figure 1. The Blois rubric: clinical judgment and computers.
(Adapted with permission from Blois MS [18].)
silicon brains function best at point B. Thus, it should be
more difficult to construct computer decision aids to handle
Blois type A problems compared with Blois type B prob-
lems. Moreover, type A programs should be expected to
function less successfully than type B programs .
The Thomas-Weisbrod rubric. Thomas (19) charac-
terizes the technology of medicine on three qualitativel y
different levels. The first level , which he calls "nontech-
nology,' is directed at those untreatable conditions for which
medicine can offer only supportive therapy (for example ,
hospice care). The second level, which he calls " halfway
technology " (but which most of us tend to think of as
conventional high technology) , is directed at the treatable
consequences of an incurable disease (for example , cardiac
transplantation and renal dialysis). The third level, which
he calls real high technology to distinguish it from conven-
tional high technology, is directed exclusively at prevention
and cure (for example, immunization and antibiotics).
Whereas Thomas (19) sees these levels of technology as
". . . so unlike each other as to seem altogether different
undertakings," Weisbrod (20) bases his conceptual model
of health expenditure on the view that they lie along a
continuum. According to this model, halfway technology
is more expensive than both nontechnology and high tech-
nology. Thus, an advance in technology (through introduc-
tion of a computer decision aid, for example) can either
increase or decrease health expenditures, depending on one's
current position along this so called Weisbrod curve (Fig.
2). According to this model , a computer decision aid di-
rected at a Weisbrod type A problem (located to the left of
the curve's peak) will not be cost-effective unless it rep-
resents a major technologic leap. In contrast, a computer
decision aid directed at a Weisbrod type B problem (located
to the right of the peak) will be cost-effective even if it
represents only a marginal advance . (The Weisbrod curve
is reminiscent in some ways of the better known Laffer
curve-the theoretical basis for supply side economics. Un-
fortunately, the real world is more complex than would
appear from the Laffer curve (21) and the same might be
said with respect to the Weisbrod curve.)
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Figure 2. The Weisbrod rubric: medical technology and health
expenditure. (Adapted from Weisbrod BA [20].)
How Do Computer Decision Aids Organize
Medical Knowledge?
Computer decision aids do more than just store and re-
trieve information; they encode knowledge (information in
context). The characteristics of eight such systems (22-29)
are shown in Table I.
Structure. The most common approaches to encoding
knowledge are based on algorithms (arithmetic computa-
tion) or heuristics (symbolic rules). The distinction between
the two is best described by analogy with a split brain model
(30), whereby algorithms are analogous to the analytic,
ratiocinative functions of the left hemisphere, whereas heu-
ristics are analogous to the synthetic, intuitive functions of
the right hemisphere. As for the brain, this analogy suggests
that optimal performance will be achieved by using a com-
bination of both approaches.
Algorithms. One of the most popular multivariate al-
gorithms is based on Bayes' theorem, whereby a posttest
outcome measure (for example, disease probability) is cal-
culated from the pretest measure and some index of the
observation with respect to the outcome (for example, sen-
sitivity and specificity). The resultant posttest probability
then serves as the pretest probability for the next test (31).
There are three problems with this approach: 1) reliable
estimates of pretest probability are often not available; 2)
sensitivities and specificities are sometimes highly biased
(32-34); and 3) it is usually assumed without adequate jus-
tification that all observations are conditionally independent
(35-38). In the face of these limitations, the empiric per-
formance of the method is best summarized by the quip that
a good Bayesian does better than a non-Bayesian, while a
bad Bayesian gets clobbered.
Discriminant analysis. This analysis employs an al-
gorithm that maximizes a mathematic function derived from
some set of continuous variables that discriminate between
two or more mutually exclusive outcomes (38). Despite its
strong theoretical foundations, however, this algorithm has
important practical limitations. First, unlike probabilities,
discriminant scores are abstract constructs with no natural
clinical interpretation. Second, the model requires 1) that
input variables derive from a multivariate normal distribu-
tion; 2) that interaction terms are included to account for
conditional nonindependence; and 3) that the degree of de-
pendence among input variables is the same for each out-
come group. At least one of these assumptions is usually
violated in the process of clinical application.
Logistic regression. This algorithm is more robust than
discriminant analysis because no distributional assumptions
for the input variables are required and, as with Bayesian
analysis, because the output measure is directly interpretable
as a probability (38). Unlike the others, however, this al-
gorithm is capable of discriminating only between two groups
and, as with discriminant analysis, interaction terms must
be included if the input variables are not independent. *
Heuristics. Rules of thumb are much more appealing
than algorithms largely because they are not mathematical
and because they seem to approximate more closely the way
people make decisions ("always kick on fourth down" or
"never vote for the incumbent"). But such simplicity is
often deceptive (40). Although few of us have any difficulty
identifying each representation in Figure 3 as a stylized
variation on the letter A, it is not easy to come up with a
simple rule that defines what we might call the "essence of
A-ness"-a rule that correctly characterizes all As without
ever incorrectly characterizing any other letters such as Hs
and Vs. Fortunately, medical classification tasks are much
less difficult than pattern recognition tasks such as this. Here
is a simple, reasonably good medical heuristic:
IF the patient has posttussive rales, AND the patient has no
fever, THEN the patient probably has heart failure.
Heuristic rules like this are the basis of knowledge rep-
resentation in a number of so-called "expert systems" (41).
Such programs are readily updated with new knowledge and
can be made to explain the "reasoning" behind their con-
*The common belief that logistic and discriminant regression do not
require the unpalatable independence assumption (39) is not necessarily
correct. Two variables (such as age and gender) are conditionally inde-
pendent if knowledge about the probability (p) of one of them provides
no informationabout the other: p(age) = p(agelgender)and p(age)op(gender)
= p(age and gender). But two variables that are conditionally independent
with respect to each other need not be conditionally independent with
respect to a third variable. Neither age nor gender, for example, are con-
ditionally independent with respect to the presence of coronary artery
disease (CAO): p(CAOlage) <¥-> p(CAOlage and gender); and
p(CAOlage).p(CAOlgender) <¥-> p(CAOlage and gender). The exponent
of a logistic equation that predicts coronary artery disease using variables
defined to be independent only in the first sense takes the form: C =
Cage·age + Cgender·gender. However, the resultant logistic equation does
not account for independence defined in the second sense (interaction).
To do so, one needs to compute a revised exponent that includes at least
the additional first order interaction term: K = Kage·age + Kgender·gender
+ Kage-gender·age.gender. Ignoring the interaction terms is equivalent to
assuming that age and gender (although conditionally independent with
respect to each other) are also conditionally independent with respect to
disease status. This is materially equivalent to assuming conditional in-
dependence with respect to serial Bayesian analysis.
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Aid
MYCIN
Acid-base electrolyte
Intemist-l
ATTENDING
Digitalis advisor
CADENZA
HT-ATTENDING
Predictive instrument
Domain
Infectious disease
Internalmedicine
Internal medicine
Anesthesiology
Cardiology
Cardiology
Cardiology
Cardiology
Hardware
Main
Mini
Main
Main
Main
Micro
Micro
Calc
Structure
Heuristic
Algorithm
Heuristic
Heuristic
Algorithm/heuristic
Algorithm/heuristic
Heuristic
Algorithm
Function
Consultant
Management
Consultant
Critiquing
Management
Consultant
Critiquing
Management
Calc = calculator; Main = mainframe; Micro = microcomputer; Mini = minicomputer.
elusions, On the other hand, heuristics provide less satis-
factory ways to express confidence (42) than do computa-
tional algorithms (in which uncertainty is readily quantified
as a standard deviation, for example).
Function. Consultative systems. Computer decision aids
can perform a diversity of functions. Consultative systems
accept patient information as input and provide specific di-
agnostic or therapeutic advice as output. For example, the
individual patient's medical record often takes the form of
a simple temporal "stack." Whenever a new test result is
obtained and the test report is added to the medical record
(at the top of the stack), the physician needs to interpret it
in light of everything that came before (all the information
beneath it in the stack). Program input might be summarized
by only a few numbers-a previous probability of disease
and the current test result to be analyzed, for instance. The
output is a revised probability of disease, which becomes
one component of the input for analysis of subsequent test
results.
Critiquing systems. Often, a physician has formulated a
test or treatment plan, but would like some advice con-
cerning its suitability. Has something important been ne-
glected (a potential drug interaction, for example)? Cri-
tiquing systems accept patient data along with the action
contemplated by the physician as input, and then provide a
criticism of that plan along with one or more proposed
alternatives. Given a patient with atypical chest pain and
left ventricular hypertrophy, it could remind the physician
that the electrocardiographic (ECG) stress test he plans to
perform can be misleading in the face of rest ST-T wave
abnormalities, and could suggest an alternative or additional
Figure 3. Heuristics: what is the essence of A-ness?
ofA'gJ~AA
~~~AIAI~
AAAaqBA
procedure (such as perfusion scintigraphy) to improve re-
liability.
Management systems. Sometimes the physician has a
goal in mind, but not a plan. Management systems accept
patient information and the physician's diagnostic or ther-
apeutic goal as input and provide a plan tailored to that goal
as output. For example, if the physician defined his goal as
that of an accurate diagnosis regardless of cost, the optimal
testing plan would be output. If monetary considerations
were introduced, a more cost-effective testing plan would
be output. The physician could change these goals or the
input data at will, and thereby perform a series of "what
if" analyses (43).
How Accurate Are Computer Decision Aids?
Standards of performance. When an expert is faced
with an unfamiliar problem, he readily recognizes his lim-
itations. Computer decision aids are far less sophisticated;
they don't know when they don't know. For this reason,
their validation should be especially thorough. Few such
studies have been conducted, however, and fewer still have
attempted to define the standards by which such performance
is to be assessed. The ultimate accolade for any computer
decision aid is to have its advice taken as seriously as that
of an expert medical consultant. One test of this rigorous
standard is to determine if established experts are able to
distinguish in any way between the advice offered by their
human peers and that offered by the decision aid when both
are presented in an identical format (as in written reports,
for example). This simple but powerful "imitation game"
is called a Turing test in honor of the British mathematician
who first proposed it as an operational test of machine in-
telligence (44).
Whitbeck and Brooks (45) think that a computer decision
aid should be judged not only in terms of its accuracy, but
also with respect to the appropriateness of its conclusions
and the scope of its considerations. One needs to know what
alternative conclusions might have been drawn, the degree
of confidence in each conclusion (46) and the consequences
that might result from acting on the wrong conclusion. The
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best way to assess the performance of a computer decision
aid, they say, is by assessing its ability to explain its' 'rea-
soning." This however is not an easy task. The quality of
one's reasoning-clinician or computer-depends on both
rhetorical (is the explanation relevant?) and dialectical (is
the explanation logical?) aspects. A logical and relevant
explanation is clearly more persuasive than one that is il-
logical and irrelevant, but we would have a difficult time
choosing between the remaining alternatives.
Wasson et al. (47) recently proposed a number of stan-
dards that should be required of what they term "clinical
prediction rules," and concluded that a majority of vali-
dation studies failed to meet these standards. Only 42%
contained an adequately detailed description of the predic-
tion rule, only 34% measured the rule's error rate and only
6% determined the effect of the rule on patient care. In
addition, investigators too often fail to distinguish between
the promise of performance (efficacy) and performance itself
(effectiveness) (48), and ignore the distorting effects of var-
ious biases (34,49-52). As a result, what works under ideal
academic conditions might not work in the community.
Computer-aided diagnosis of coronary artery disease.
CADENZA is a microcomputer program based on Bayes'
theorem that was specifically developed to aid the physician
in interpreting clinical data relative to the diagnosis and
functional evaluation of coronary artery disease (27,53).
The program operates on an Apple II or IBM-PC computer.
A FORTRAN version (54) is also available for mainframe
use. The program's output consists of a two page document
containing a tabulation of the input data, a graphic statistical
analysis and a narrative summary regarding the patient's
symptoms, the level of physical fitness relative to age and
gender, the adequacy of exercise for diagnosis of coronary
ischemia, the potential anatomic location and functional
severity of coronary artery disease and the risk of a coronary
event over the next year. This document can serve as the
official clinical report for a stress laboratory after overread-
ing by the supervising physician.
CADENZA can analyze data from the patient's clinical
history, from conventional coronary risk factors and from
a number of noninvasive diagnostic tests such as exercise
ECG and radionuclide imaging. The program also allows
the user to perform his own "what if" analyses. If he is
thinking about ordering a stress test on a particular patient,
for example, he can enter the data that are already available
along with one or more anticipated test responses. The change
in disease probability on the basis of these fictitious test
results allows one to judge the relative contribution of as
yet unavailable information.
Numeric analysis. Sensitivity and specificity estimates
used by the program are derived from the published medical
experience encompassing over 60,000 patients (27). When
appropriate, these data are fitted to various frequency dis-
tributions to allow the analysis of each test observation as
a continuous variable rather than as a dichotomous outcome
(27,55,56). These values are further adjusted relative to the
amount of exercise performed. The data set for each test is
then analyzed by serial application of Bayes' formula, re-
sulting in an increase or decrease in the probability of dis-
ease. The final probability and standard deviation are used
to construct a probability distribution, from which are cal-
culated several indexes that quantify the degree of confi-
dence in the assessment (27,46,55).
Test interpretation. The set of observations that make
up each test is interpreted as "normal," "abnormal" or
"equivocal" according to a rule that compares the true
positive rate (± 1 SD) with the false positive rate (± 1
SD). An interpretation of normal means that the observa-
tions are significantly more often encountered in the absence
of disease, whereas abnormal means that the observations
are significantly more often encountered in the presence of
disease. The term equivocal means there is no significant
difference between the true and false positive rates (56).
Clinical validation. We validated CADENZA in a pro-
spective study of 1,097 patients (27); 170 of them underwent
diagnostic coronary angiography and the remainder were
followed up for 1 year from the date of testing to detect
subsequent coronary events (death and nonfatal infarction).
Three findings were noteworthy: 1) probability of disease
predicted angiographic prevalence with an average error of
only 3%; 2) the higher the probability of disease, the greater
the severity of angiographic disease; and 3) the higher the
probability of disease, the greater the incidence of coronary
events. In a subsequent study (57), CADENZA probabilities
also correlated with coronary events in 215 patients with
previous myocardial infarction, and in an additional 491
patients with suspected coronary artery disease.
A number of other investigators have validated CAD-
ENZA. Wong et al. (58) showed that disease probability
was highly predictive of angiographic prevalence in 68 cath-
eterized patients, and observed that the probability estimates
for 253 patients correlated significantly with the beliefs of
experienced clinical cardiologists. Greenberg et al. (59)
compared the results of multivariate discriminant analysis
with CADENZA in 113 patients undergoing ECG stress
testing. They found that the two methods of analysis were
equally accurate. Detrano et al. (39) reported similar results
in 303 patients undergoing thallium scintigraphy and cardiac
fluoroscopy in addition to ECG stress testing using logistic
regression analysis and a Bayesian model very similar to
that in CADENZA. Hlatky et al. (60) reported that CAD-
ENZA was slightly, but significantly, more accurate than
the clinical judgment of 91 experienced cardiologists in the
analysis of stress ECG and thallium scintigraphy. Melin et
al. (61) reported that a probabilistic testing strategy based
on CADENZA improved the cost-effectiveness of nonin-
vasive testing in 135 women, whereas Detry et al. (62)
confirmed the utility of CADENZA in comparison with
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Will Physicians Use Computer Decision Aids?
Published surveys. New technology is always suspect.
It was once feared that the invention of papyrus would cause
memory capacity to dry up if people could write everything
down, and that the invention of printing would prevent them
from thinking for themselves if they could read the thoughts
of others. In our own time, we are similarly warned that
the use of electronic calculators in schools will cause the
degradation of mathematic skills. Physicians, then, might
well see the computer as some sort of "Big Brother" that
threatens to monitor their competence, to justify the denial
of their fees and ultimately to replace them as decision
makers. Do they?
Singer et al. (73) recently surveyed the attitudes of 296
physicians regarding their use of computer data bases; 37%
of these physicians were not satisfied with their ability to
keep up with new medical developments; 76% said that they
wanted to implement or increase their use of computers in
clinical practice; 69% thought that the computer would be
useful as a source of published information; 42% thought
that it would improve their access to the results of clinical
trials; and 28% thought that it could be very useful in pro-
viding probability estimates of successful treatment out-
comes. In summary, these physicians indicated by a margin
of 2 to I that computers could significantly improve their
practice of medicine. Similar encouraging attitudes have
been reported by others (74-76).
a diagnosis of coronary artery disease using only 13 such
rules.
We compared these heuristic interpretations with prob-
abilistic interpretations derived from CADENZA, and with
the expert interpretations of 21 clinical cardiologists using
42 hypothetic test cases (71), each based on two exercise
variables (peak heart rate and systolic blood pressure), two
ECG variables (magnitude and slope of ST segment depres-
sion) and two scintigraphic variables (number and severity
of myocardial perfusion defects). The clinicians and the
heuristic program interpreted each case on a seven point
ordinal scale ranging from I (definitely normal) to 7 (def-
initely abnormal). Clinician interpretations correlated line-
arly with log odds of disease from CADENZA (r = 0.91,
P < 0.001). Heuristic interpretations and clinician inter-
pretations were highly correlated (Fig. 4); 36% of the cli-
nician and heuristic interpretations were in precise agree-
ment and 35% differed by only a single grade. The overall
accuracy of the heuristic interpretations (referenced to the
pooled clinician interpretations) was not significantly dif-
ferent from those derived from CADENZA (87 ± 16%
versus 88 ± 14%). These findings suggest that a relatively
simple heuristic system can perform almost as well as a
complex numeric algorithm (72).
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Figure 4. Heuristic interpretation versus clinician interpretation.
Each circle represents a mean value (± SD). The number of pa-
tients (Pts.) includedin each mean valueis notedalongthe bottom
of the illustration. The solid line is the line of identity and the
dotted line is derived from linear regression. N = seven point
ordinal scale ranging from 1 (definitely normal) to 7 (definitely
abnormal) (71).
multivariate analysis in 387 men. Several other studies (63-68)
have confirmed the accuracy of empiric Bayesian analysis
with respect to the diagnosis of coronary artery disease,
despite the potentially serious theoretical limitations inher-
ent in the model.
Similar validations of several non-Bayesian algorithms
have been conducted. For example, Lee et al. (69) recently
compared the accuracy of a multivariate survival model with
that of five expert cardiologists in predicting I and 3 year
survival in 350 patients with coronary artery disease. Cli-
nicians were not consistent when confronted with a large
number of variables. Consequently, the statistical algorithm
was more accurate than were the clinicians in predicting
survival.
Algorithms versus heuristics. Although the accuracy
of algorithmic decision aids such as these can equal or
exceed that of conventional clinical opinion, heuristic sys-
tems are often more practical whenever the requisite data
base is not available or when unacceptable violations of the
assumptions inherent in the model occur. We recently de-
veloped the prototype of such an expert system (70) using
a commercial development tool called RuleMaster (Radian
Corporation). This tool contains an automatic rule generator
that translates declarative knowledge in the form of ex-
amples into procedural knowledge in the form of if-then-
else rules. The resultant system interprets exercise ECG and
exercise myocardial perfusion scintigraphy with respect to
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Figure 5. Behavior of 17 referring cardiologists compared with
that predicted from their beliefs (80).
100 r-------------------,
To determine if physicians actually use such road maps,
we analyzed the pattern of referral for scintigraphic stress
testing in 2,213 patients with suspected coronary disease
and compared this behavior with that predicted for 17 re-
ferring cardiologists by a questionnaire designed to elicit
their strategic beliefs (80). A total of 316 patients (14%)
were referred for a second test within 30 days of the first
test (perfusion scintigraphy if radionuclide angiography had
been performed first or vice versa). The cardiologists iden-
tified three factors (each indicative of diagnostic uncertainty)
they thought would most lead them to request a second test.
They believed that they would refer 60% of patients with
an equivocal interpretation of the scintigraphic test, 62%
of patients with discordance between the ECG and scinti-
graphic responses (one interpreted as normal and the other
as abnormal) and 74% of patients with an intermediate prob-
ability of disease after the first test.
The actual behavior of referring cardiologists was very
different from that predicted from these beliefs (Fig. 5).
Only 11% (61 of 517) of patients with an equivocal inter-
pretation, 23% (118 of 566) with discordance and 17% (85
of 488) with an intermediate probability (between 0.1 and
0.9 using CADENZA) were referred for a second test (p <
0.001 for each). These values are not significantly different
from the 16% referral rate in patients without evidence of
diagnostic uncertainty. Thus, contrary to what these phy-
sicians believed, diagnostic uncertainty did not influence
their testing behavior. Many patients who did not seem to
need a second test received it, whereas an even greater
number who did seem to need the test did not receive it.
Computer decision aids, then, might improve these utili-
zation patterns by calling such inconsistencies to the phy-
sician's attention.
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A somewhat different perspective is provided from a
survey of 933 physicians, residents and medical students by
Anderson et al. (77). Although these subjects acknowledged
the computer's potential for reducing the cost and improving
the quality of care, they also expressed concerns about gov-
ernmental and hospital control of their practices, threats to
privacy, legal difficulties and ethical dilemmas. For these
reasons, computer decision aids might end up being used
only by those who develop them (78). Witness, for instance,
an official response to the suggestion that a respected profes-
sional decision analyst conduct a formal multi-attribute anal-
ysis of the decision to locate a liquid natural gas storage
facility along the California coast (79): "Absolutely not!
And it's not because [he] isn't an excellent analyst, but
because he doesn't work for me and therefore he would be
out of my control. "
Our experience is more gratifying. We recently surveyed
50 physicians who had been using CADENZA for 1, III
months (22 per physician) on 28,992 patients (580 per phy-
sician). Only 12% used computers frequently in their prac-
tice; 24% used them occasionally, 26% rarely and 38%
never; 78% said they use CADENZA to analyze the results
of ECG stress testing, 52% to help decide who needs ad-
ditional testing and 30% to analyze the results of additional
testing; 78% said they use the information in the computer
report to supplement their own report, whereas 60% mail
the report to referring physicians, and 24% use it as a re-
placement for their own report. Satisfaction with the pro-
gram averaged 4.0 on a five point scale (where 1 is low and
5 is high); 25% rated the program a 5, 57% rated it a 4,
16% rated it a 3 and 2% rated it a 2; none gave it a rating
of 1. These data indicate a relatively high level of acceptance
of this computer decision aid by these practicing physicians.
Referral patterns. Strategic planning is an important
potential application for computer decision aids. Never be-
fore, for instance, has the physician caring for a patient
admitted to the coronary care unit with a suspected acute
ischemic syndrome had more options available beyond those
provided by conventional ECG monitoring, serum enzyme
analysis and antiarrhythmia prophylaxis. The additional
choices include Holter ECG, echocardiography, radio-
nuclide angiography, thallium scintigraphy, pyrophosphate
scanning, cardiac catheterization, coronary angiography, as-
pirin, heparin, nitrates, beta blockers, calcium channel an-
tagonists, intravenous or intracoronary streptokinase, tissue
plasminogen activator, counterpulsation, coronary angio-
plasty, and coronary bypass surgery. There are exactly 217
or 131,072 combinations and 17! or 355,687,428,096,000
permutations among these alternatives (the actual number
of choices probably lies somewhere between these ex-
tremes). Thus, just as the prudent driver uses a road map
to plan the most direct or most scenic route, the prudent
physician might want a road map of his management alter-
natives before setting out on an analogous journey.
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In a similar study, Epstein and McNeil (81) compared
the beliefs and behavior of 27 office physicians with respect
to the ordering of common laboratory tests (ECGs, urina-
lyses, chest radiographs and blood counts) in 324 hyper-
tensive patients. In contrast with our findings, beliefs and
behavior were significantly correlated, and the most im-
portant reasons for ordering these tests were: 1) to help with
treatment decisions, 2) to reassure the patient, 3) to assess
prognosis and 4) to establish a baseline. These data coupled
with our own indicate that utilization patterns are likely to
vary from disease to disease and from test to test.
Will Patients Accept the Use of Computers
by Physicians?
In a recent British survey (82), 17% of patients opposed
the use of computers by their doctors, the majority fearing
a breach in confidentiality. A controlled field study (83) of
patient reactions to computer use by their doctors during
general practice encounters tends to contradict this view.
The investigators observed no degradation in the patients'
perceptions of the doctors' attentiveness and rapport, or their
satisfaction with or their confidence in the treatment re-
ceived. They concluded that the response of the patient to
such encounters is influenced more by which doctor he sees
than by whether that doctor uses a computer. An engaging
anecdote serves to underscore this conclusion: on seeing her
doctor using a computer decision aid, one patient is said to
have exclaimed, "Isn't this wonderful? Now you doctors
won't have to guess so much anymore!" (Weed LL, per-
sonal communication).
What Are the Legal and
Economic Implications?
Federal software regulation. The Food and Drug
Administration is currently developing a policy to regulate
medical software systems as medical devices (84). Candi-
date areas of importance include 1) the appropriateness of
the underlying model (algorithms and heuristics); 2) evi-
dence that the model was correctly implemented in software;
3) evidence that undesirable changes will not take place in
copying, distribution and use; 4) a description of software
safety; 5) proper labeling of the performance specifications
and hardware requirements, and 6) documentation of soft-
ware changes that affect safety and effectiveness. The con-
templated policy is directed only at commercial systems,
and FDA commissioner Frank E. Young has voiced his
reassuring opinion that, "In principle, any time the phy-
sician's judgment can override the judgment of the computer
.... then FDA has little or no [regulatory] responsibility"
(85). Nevertheless, in defining the minimal criteria of an
acceptable medical decision aid (even if only in terms of
marketability), the agency will simultaneously be defining
the characteristics of an acceptable medical decision. This
could have a material medicolegal impact on the entire
profession.
Medicolegal liability. Will the use of computer decision
aids increase the physician's exposure to legal liability?
Because the first case claiming personal injury resulting
from the use of medical software has yet to be filed, one
can only conjecture over the position the courts will take
on this matter. According to Weistart (86), the legal test
for liability is entirely dependent on the medical profession's
standard of reasonable care, and not on an externally im-
posed norm. Computer decision aids can thereby reduce the
physician's liability exposure by helping codify and dissem-
inate such standards. Miller et a1. (87) note that a physician
who relies on the advice of a computer decision aid could
be held as negligent as one who relies on the advice of a
human consultant, but only if it is judged that he should
have known the advice was substandard. As the availability
of medical computers increases, they warn also of an equal
potential for liability if the physician is judged to have failed
to exercise reasonable care by not having consulted a com-
puter decision aid.
Conflict of interest. Conflict of interest is inevitable in
any complex socioeconomic system (88,89). Suppose, for
example, that a physician and patient are considering whether
or not to initiate a treatment that has some probability (p)
of being effective, and 1 - P of not being effective. We
denote G as the gain to the patient if he is given the treatment
and it is effective, whereas L is the loss to the patient if he
is given the treatment and it is not effective. If we assume
that the losses associated with nontreatment are negligible,
the patient's utility is represented by the net gain associated
with effective treatment minus the net loss associated with
ineffective treatment: G'p - L{I - p). As long as this
value is positive (gain outweighs loss), the patient should
prefer to be treated, and this occurs whenever p > L/(G +
L). Similarly, g is the gain to the physician if he gives the
treatment and it is effective, whereas 1 is the loss to the
physician if he gives the treatment and it is not effective.
The physician's utility then is: g'p - l'(l - p), and he
should prefer to initiate treatment as long as this value is
positive. This occurs whenever p > l/(g + I). If l/(g + I)
> P > L/(G + L), however, the preferences of the patient
and the physician will be in conflict: the patient has more
to gain by being treated, whereas the physician has more
to gain by not offering the treatment. Thus, conflicts will
occur any time the physician values his gains and losses
differently than does the patient. It makes no difference
what units each uses to quantify these gains and losses (the
physician could be interested in survival, and the patient
could be interested in quality of life), it is only the ratio of
gain to loss that counts. In such cases, computer decision
aids can expose the potential for conflict before it occurs,
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or can help adjudicate conflicts that do occur by requiring
all parties to make their private utilities public.
Conclusions
A recent White Paper prepared by the U. S. Department
of Commerce (90) predicts that:
the computer . . .. will redistribute worldly wealth in the
form of knowledge .... [and] will alter human existence
as profoundly as did the control of fire, the emergence of
speech or the agricultural revolution.
Whether one accepts such hyperbole, computer decision
aids-at the very least-promise the physician clinically
applicable ways to deliver formal decision models to the
bedside. If this promise alone is realized, the computer will
1) help us make hidden assumptions explicit, 2) allow us
to determine whether a given clinical opinion is consistent
with those assumptions and with the conventional rules of
logic, and 3) provide us access to a relevant data base,
thereby supplementing our limited personal experience by
placing it into a broader perspective. It will not compete
with the practicing physician in the process of clinical de-
cision making, but rather interact with him as a colleague
in that process (46,91,92). For this promise to be fulfilled,
however, the physician must play an active role in devel-
oping the requisite software, in establishing the domain of
its application and in defining the standards for its assess-
ment (93,94). The computer scientists and knowledge en-
gineers, for their part, must assure that the software com-
municates effectively and conveniently with the physician
(preferably using natural language), and that it is capable
of convincingly explaining the reasoning behind its conclu-
sions-something even the best of us sometimes has trouble
doing. The following fanciful dialogue is faithful to this
spirit:
A: Accordingto the clinicalhistory, your patienthas a 75%
probability of angiographically significant coronary ar-
tery disease.
Q: How sure are you?
A: The standard deviation of my estimate is II %. There-
fore, the actual probability lies somewhere between 55
and 91% with 90% confidence.
Q: What is the clinical significance of these numbers?
A: An average man of this age has a 1.0 ± 0.6% chance
of dying over the next year, and a median survival of
23.2 years (to age 78). This man's probabilityof coro-
nary artery disease gives him a 3.2 ± 1.2% chance of
dying over the next year, and a median survivalof only
12.4 years (to age 67). This representsa 47% reduction
in life expectancy.
Q: Should I do an ECG stress test?
A: For what purpose?
Q: Prognosis.
A: Exercise electrocardiography coupled with myocardial
perfusion scintigraphy can revise the median survival
of 12.4 years to as much as 23.1 years, or to as little
as 7.8 years.
Q: What if the resultant median survival is only 10 years?
A: A formal decision analysis based on data at this insti-
tution supports a recommendation of myocardial revas-
cularization to any man this age with a median survival
<10.6 years. A decision between angioplasty and by-
pass surgery depends on coronary anatomy.
Q: What assumptions are implicit in your judgment?
A: Well, to begin with, I believe in what I am doing ....
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